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ABSTRACT: Although researchers have made progress in understanding motivations behind local
government collaboration, there is little research that explores the spatial dynamics of such interactions.
Does the idea of collaboration travel horizontally, passed from neighbor to neighbor, or is vertical
leadership from state, county, or regional actors more important in influencing local governments’
decisions to share resources and functions? What factors influence local governments’ choices to
collaborate with their neighbors versus a regional entity, county, or state government? In this article,
we investigate the importance of vertical and horizontal influences when local governments decide
to collaborate around land use planning. Using data from a survey of Michigan local government
officials, we take a spatial statistical approach to answering this question. We find widespread evidence
of collaboration at multiple scales, and observe patterns of both horizontal and vertical influence. We
also find that contextual factors help to explain these patterns of collaboration.
Enthusiasm for regional land use planning has evolved from the “early days” of the 1990s, when
advocates recommended new regional governments with broad powers, to a more recent emphasis
on voluntary interlocal collaborative efforts. In the current era of fiscal austerity, such collaborative
efforts are also gaining support from politicians interested in eliminating duplication of services
between small jurisdictions (Snyder, 2011). However, we still do not know much about what motivates
communities to collaborate (Carr, Gerber, & Lupher, 2009), nor do we know if the theoretical shift
in emphasis from regional to interlocal planning has been accompanied by a similar enthusiasm
for interlocal land use planning agreements in practice. Furthermore, collaboration is inherently
spatial. To collaborate, a local government needs partners—neighboring jurisdictions, counties,
or regional organizations—with which to collaborate. A local government may also need other
resources provided by neighboring jurisdictions or organizations to facilitate collaboration, including
information, leadership, capacity, experience, and evidence of best practices. In each case, proximity
matters: the availability of partners, information and resources will depend to a large extent on
geographic location (Post, 2002). To our knowledge, the planning and urban policy literatures
have not yet empirically tested the potentially important spatial component of partnership between
governments. We also do not yet understand what factors influence whether governments collaborate
horizontally, vertically, or both.
This study seeks to understand in what ways local governments are actually involved in
collaboration—vertically (with regional and/or county partners), horizontally (with other local gov-
ernments), or with some combination of both—and how spatial effects at various geographic scales
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shape that collaboration. Specifically, we investigate three important questions about intergovern-
mental collaboration around land use. First, to what extent are horizontal and vertical collaboration
complements versus substitutes? In other words, are communities who collaborate with their peers
more or less likely to collaborate with regional organizations, and vice versa? Second, to what extent
does the spatial environment influence the way governments think about collaboration? Here, we
explore whether it matters “what the neighbors are up to.” Does an environment of collaboration
lead a community to collaborate, or are there other, non-spatial factors that matter more? And fi-
nally, to what extent is the answer to question two a matter of motivation versus opportunity? In
other words, if the data demonstrate spatial effects, are these effects the result of practical consid-
erations, in which a jurisdiction seeks out partnerships to solve specific problems, or are they the
result of cultural factors, either in that collaboration has become a standard regional approach to
resolving issues or that entrepreneurial communities or agencies are creating a deliberate network of
collaborations?
We employ two statistical approaches that prove to be useful tools for analyzing interlocal and
regional patterns of collaboration. Using data from a recent survey of Michigan local government
officials, the first approach employs multivariate regression analysis in which characteristics of a
local government and its spatial context are explanatory variables in a regression analysis of general
collaborative outcomes. The second approach is a hot spot analysis in ArcGIS that tests for the
existence of clusters of high and low levels of collaboration around land use at different geographic
scales. We demonstrate collaborative influences at three scales: interlocal, county, and regional. Our
results indicate that while interlocal collaboration around land use planning is very much alive, large-
scale countywide and regional planning remain frequent forms of collaboration as well. We find that
both internal and external factors shape a local government’s decisions to collaborate horizontally
or vertically, but that these factors have different effects on horizontal and vertical collaboration
decisions, indicating that jurisdictions face different motivations to engage in different types of
collaboration.
In the following section, we review the literature on regionalism and horizontal and vertical collab-
oration, with a particular emphasis on collaborative land use planning, and present our hypotheses.
We then describe our data and methodology in detail, explaining how measures of spatial context
and hot spot analyses can reveal spatial patterns that are otherwise unobserved. We then discuss our
statistical results and present conclusions about how these findings and techniques may apply to
future research.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COLLABORATION: HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL
Several recent studies have attempted to understand both what motivates local intergovernmental
collaboration and what factors predict its success, with mixed results (e.g., Carr et al., 2009). Making
the issue more complicated, motivations to collaborate may be different for “systems maintenance”
functions, such as sewer and water and public safety, than for “lifestyle” functions, such as land use
planning and social services (Gainsborough, 2002; Howell-Moroney, 2008; Williams, 1967). There
is especially uncertainty in the literature around the role of fiscal capacity (Leroux & Carr, 2007),
although our own recent research suggests that fiscal pressures play a role in support for collaboration
even on lifestyle functions like planning, where their influence was expected to be minimal (Gerber
& Loh, 2011). Furthermore, given the fragmented nature of the U.S. political system, it is unclear
how the chain of influence flows between governments—horizontally or vertically—regardless of
whether governments decide to work together at either an interlocal or a regional scale (Carr et al.,
2009).
Horizontal Collaboration
Horizontal collaboration is defined as “joint activities involving two or more governmental units at
the same level of government” (Carr et al., 2009, p. 208). There is some evidence that spatial consid-
erations affect the likelihood of horizontal collaboration. Post (2002) finds that increased geographic
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density of governments (essentially, increased fragmentation), is associated with higher levels of col-
laboration, though her measure includes counties, cities, towns, and townships, making it impossible
to distinguish between horizontal and vertical collaboration. Carr et al. (2009), however, find the
opposite: increased local government fragmentation is associated with a decrease in collaboration
both horizontally and vertically.
Although we typically think of these horizontal relationships as involving geographically proximate
units collaborating around processes or service delivery (Leroux & Carr, 2007), cities that are leaders
on a particular issue, such as climate change policy, may collaborate with other high capacity cities on
a national or even global level, forming “networks of pioneers for pioneers” (Kern & Alber, 2009, p. 1).
Numerous studies have found that local government leadership is critical in decisions to collaborate
around services (Post, 2004; Zeemering, 2009). Frederickson’s theory of administrative conjunction
posits local administrators as key actors in the “horizontal formal and informal” connections and
relationships that lead to or preclude collaboration (Frederickson, 1999, p. 708). Collaboration
depends in part on how interconnected administrators and other local government officials are, and
how well they know and trust each other (Feiock, 2007; Gerber, 2005; Thurmaier, 2006). Regional
norms around collaboration may affect local support for regional efforts (Olberding, 2002) and
may in fact help predict the frequency and success of horizontal collaborative agreements (Visser,
2002). Proponents of voluntary horizontal collaboration to achieve regional goals call this approach
“governance without government” (Savitch & Vogel, 2000, p. 164).
Individual community characteristics may also help explain whether governments decide to col-
laborate with neighbors. For example, population characteristics such as income, education, and
partisanship/ideology may affect residents’ preferences for local government policies and practices
(Gainsborough, 2002; Mohamed, 2008). Communities with lower property values and tax bases may
consider the potential cost savings from collaboration to be of higher value than do wealthier com-
munities. On the other hand, local governments may avoid partnering with neighboring communities
seen as fiscally weak, not wanting to tie their fortunes to a bad risk (Carr et al., 2009).
Vertical Collaboration
In vertical collaboration, actors within a hierarchy of governments form partnerships in various
ways. Higher levels of government, such as state, county, or regional governments, may influence
local actions through enabling (creating guidelines and providing information), provision (providing
services for local governments to advance a particular goal), and actual command-and-control author-
ity (Kern & Alber, 2009), although the first two (voluntary) collaborative relationships are much more
common in the United States.1 Counties, in particular, have a built-in role in coordinating functions
among local governments, as well as directly providing services, so it may make sense to “[extend]
the theory of administrative conjunction to county government” (Zeemering, 2009, p. 169).2
Vertical collaboration in the area of land use planning can take the form of city-county (or
township-county) partnerships in which the county provides planning services for the local jurisdic-
tion; county-wide collaboration in which the county takes over primary planning functions for its
local jurisdictions; regional planning where a multijurisdiction or multicounty organization provides
planning services to its members; and statewide efforts in which state actors replace or supplement
local planning operations.
Concurrent Efforts
Rather than a straightforward story of interlocal, horizontal efforts supplanting larger visions of
regional governance, the current situation may be more nuanced. As Boyle and Mohamed (2007) find,
an individual local government may be involved in multiple collaborative efforts: participating in
small-scale collaborative efforts with neighboring governments; receiving assistance from its county
and participating in countywide planning activities; and being a member of a regional council of
governments. These multiple efforts should not necessarily be interpreted as a regional planning
renaissance, however. For some communities, participating in multiple regional planning efforts is
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necessary because of dissatisfaction with the performance of one or more regional bodies (Boyle &
Mohamed, 2007). For others, participation in intergovernmental activities is mandated by either the
state or federal government (such as with MPOs), giving them little choice in the matter (May, 1995).
Building on this body of literature, we hypothesize that a given local government may engage in
horizontal collaborative planning activities, vertical collaborative planning activities, or both. The
nature of collaboration undertaken by a local government will be a function of that unit’s internal
characteristics (e.g., population characteristics, governance capacity, political dynamics) as well as
features of the spatial environment in which it is located, where that spatial environment may be
defined at various geographic scales. Specifically, we test the following hypotheses.
H1: Local units of government whose neighbors are engaged in higher levels of intergovern-
mental collaboration are themselves more likely to collaborate.
As discussed above, the presence of neighboring units who engage in collaboration could contribute
to a local government’s likelihood of collaboration in two ways. First, the neighboring units may be
partners with which a given local government can initiate collaboration (motivation), and second,
the prevalence of collaboration may present a local government’s leaders with more opportunities to
join in ongoing collaborative efforts (opportunity). Either of these types of influence would increase
the likelihood of the unit collaborating, but possibly in different ways.
H2: Motivation is a stronger determinant of horizontal collaboration, while opportunity is a
stronger determinant of vertical collaboration.
We expect that a local jurisdiction will be more likely to initiate horizontal collaboration, at least
in part because such interlocal collaboration may be more pragmatically driven (such as solving a
particular land use problem that spills over borders or cutting costs). Local government officials thus
have an incentive to approach their neighbors to pursue mutually beneficial collaborative solutions
to those problems. By contrast, we expect vertical collaboration to be less transactional and more
focused on large-scale regional issues such as preserving open space. A single city or township may
see less direct benefit to initiating such large-scale regional efforts and instead may prefer to wait for
others—especially counties and regional actors—to initiate them.
H3: Communities who engage in horizontal collaboration are no less likely to engage in vertical
collaboration and vice versa: the two are not substitutes for one another.
Horizontal and vertical collaboration serve different purposes and are motivated by different con-
siderations. For example, in the area of land use planning, we expect that local governments pursue
horizontal collaboration when they have certain resources and capabilities such as a farmland preser-
vation initiative, an economic development program, or a professionalized planning department,
when they have multiple neighbors who can serve as potential partners, and/or when land use prob-
lems they confront are characterized by spillover across neighboring jurisdictions or solutions that
would benefit from economies of scale. They pursue vertical collaboration when they lack fund-
ing or professional or technical capacity, when their land use problems are shared by the region
as a whole, or when they have attempted to solve an issue through horizontal collaboration and
the effort has failed. In other words, horizontal and vertical collaboration are solutions to different
kinds of problems and will make sense under different circumstances. That said, the two forms of
collaboration may not be entirely independent. Once communities start to collaborate either verti-
cally or horizontally, they will experience the benefits of collaboration first-hand and may be more
likely to consider further collaboration—of either type—with different partners and/or on different
issues.
Land Use Planning Collaboration
For this article, we test our hypotheses in the context of land use planning collaboration. In the
early 1990s, the “new regionalism” spread to land use planning (Wheeler, 2002). Planners hoped that
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a regional approach would better solve some of the field’s most pressing problems, such as sprawl,
central city decline, inequitable distribution of resources, and environmental degradation (Burnley
& Murphy, 1995; Katz, 2000; Powell, 2000; Rusk, 2000). All of these problems are larger than any
single jurisdiction (and many are “wicked” in nature) (David, 2008, p. 73), so scholars theorized
that a regional approach would succeed in addressing these problems in ways that an individual,
fragmented approach could not (Calthorpe & Fulton, 2001).
Of course, the idea of regional planning has long had its skeptics, including Jane Jacobs, who
famously said, “A region is an area safely larger than the last one to whose problems we found no
solution” (Jacobs, 1961, p. 410). Large-scale regional planning successes have been few, due at least
in part to the individualistic political culture in the United States, which plays out as a reluctance on
the part of states to exercise their power over local governments, and on the part of local governments
to give up their own devolved powers (Basolo, 2003; Norris, 2001). Therefore, with a few notable
exceptions, most regional planning efforts in the United States are small in scale and voluntary in
nature. In short, they look much like other common types of intergovernmental collaboration, which
include the provision of both routine (such as water and sewer) and emergency (such as police and
fire) services (Feiock, 2008).
Collaboration around land use planning differs from collaboration to provide these types of ser-
vices in one important way, however: planning is considered a lifestyle function rather than a systems
maintenance governmental function. Several studies find that local governments face greater chal-
lenges in creating collaborative relationships around lifestyle functions, since such functions are often
values-dependent, involve questions of equity, and may create winners and losers (Gainsborough,
2002; Howell-Moroney, 2008; Williams, 1967). So, by focusing on this form of collaboration, we
may be understating the prevalence of local government collaboration in general.
What might collaboration around land use look like? Horizontal efforts could range from the
most basic sharing of plans with neighbors and with the county, to more intentional but less formal
activities such as regular meetings between individual officials around particular land use challenges,
to shorter-term joint projects to address land use in a particular area or corridor, to long-term formal
arrangements such as the formation of a joint planning commission. Vertical efforts could include
a regional council of governments that takes on a planning function, or a county-level planning
commission or planning agency that produces plans for multiple subunits. As we discuss in our
hypotheses, communities are likely have to different reasons for engaging in horizontal versus
vertical collaboration. Our study does not attempt to make a normative judgment about which types
of collaboration are better or worse (formal/informal, horizontal/vertical): different forms may be
appropriate in different settings, so we do not privilege certain types of collaboration in our analysis.
Collaboration in Michigan
In Michigan, the subject of our analysis, there are both regulatory and cultural barriers to collabo-
ration and regionalism. Although state statutes allow intergovernmental collaboration in many cases,
the specifics of the regulations limit the potential financial benefit to communities that choose to
engage in shared service agreements or other forms of collaboration that are designed to save money
(McGee & Trebilcock, 2007). Michigan’s present-day township boundaries largely follow those set
out by the surveyors of the Northwest Ordinance in the eighteenth century. Although Michigan’s high
degree of fragmentation (the number of local governments is second only to Pennsylvania) provides
many potential partners with whom to collaborate, Michigan is also considered a strong home rule
state, in which local governments are granted broad powers to address local issues (Citizens Re-
search Council, 1994). Unlike in many southern and western states, county governments only have
power over planning and zoning if their subunits choose not to exercise those powers themselves.
This fragmentation and tradition of local political independence both contribute to an individualistic
attitude among local governments (Jacobs, 2003). In addition, in recent decades, Michigan has been
one of the most racially segregated states; at the time of the 2000 Census, Michigan was home to
five of the 25 most segregated metropolitan areas in the United States (Schneider, 2003). Racial
and economic segregation has led to mistrust between urban centers and their surrounding smaller
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cities and townships, where one might otherwise expect see collaboration around shared regional
goals. These structural and political issues make collaboration, and especially collaboration around
a lifestyle function like land use planning, particularly challenging in Michigan. To be sure, such
efforts exist, but they exist in an unsupportive state milieu. To make matters more difficult, unlike
states such as Oregon and Florida, which have strong state leadership on land use planning (Burby
& May, 1997), Michigan enables but does not require its county subunits to plan. This combination
of state-level indifference to collaboration and local governmental independence is why, as we state
in our hypotheses, we expect to see such strong spatial relationships between neighbors’ collabora-
tive activity, both vertical and horizontal. The types of relationships that are able to overcome the
state’s climate of local inertia and intergovernmental mistrust are location-specific, and, as such, are
expected to exert a stronger influence on closer neighbors.
DATA
We test these hypotheses about the extent and nature of land use planning collaboration with
data from the fall 2010 Michigan Public Policy Survey (MPPS).3 MPPS is a semi-annual survey
of Michigan local government officials administered by the University of Michigan’s Center for
Local, State, and Urban Policy (CLOSUP), in partnership with the Michigan Municipal League,
the Michigan Townships Association, and the Michigan Association of Counties. For each wave
of the survey, mail or email invitations are sent to the top elected and appointed official of each
of Michigan’s 1,856 general-purpose local governments. Each official has the option of completing
the approximately 30-minute survey online, on hard copy, or over the phone. Several follow-up
contacts are made to increase response rates. Usable responses were received from 1,176 unique
local governments (64%) on the fall 2010 wave of the survey.4
The fall 2010 MPPS contained questions that allow us to investigate the extent and character
of collaborative land use planning among Michigan local governments as well as the factors that
influence that collaboration. To measure the extent of land use collaboration, we use a question that
asked respondents to indicate the extent of their jurisdiction’s collaboration with other governments
in providing fourteen different types of services. One of the possible services was land use planning
and/or zoning; respondents were allowed to indicate we do not collaborate at all, we collaborate
somewhat, we collaborate a great deal, and don’t know. We coded responses 0 for not at all, 1 for
collaborate somewhat, and 2 for collaborate a great deal. Don’t know responses were dropped, as
were records on which the respondent did not indicate any value. On this question, the collaborative
partner’s identity was not defined, so responses could include horizontal collaboration, vertical
collaboration, or both.
The fall 2010 MPPS also included a question that asked respondents with whom their jurisdiction
collaborates. Response options include state, county, city, township, village, K-12 school district,
higher education institution, regional organization, and other. Respondents were instructed to check
all that apply. This question allows us to identify instances of horizontal collaboration (when a
jurisdiction collaborates with a city, township, village, or K-12 school district), vertical collaboration
(with the state, county, or regional organization) and both. However, the question does not specify
land use planning, and so our inferences from analyses of that question apply to collaboration in
general, and not land use collaboration specifically.5
In addition, the fall 2010 MPPS asked a question about the mechanisms by which jurisdictions
entered into collaborative relationships. Respondents were asked whether, in the past two years, they
approached other governments about formal collaborative efforts, whether they were approached by
another government about collaboration, or neither. Conceptually, we can think about approaching
another government as indicating a jurisdiction’s proactive motivation for collaboration, and being
approached by another unit as reflecting an existing opportunity for collaboration. This question,
like the one about collaborative partners above, was not limited to land use collaboration. Regional
planning was offered as an example of the type of collaboration the respondents were to consider,
but responses are likely to include information about other forms of collaboration as well, and so
again, our inferences from analyses of this question apply to collaboration in general.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics, Fall 2010 Michigan Public Policy Survey
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max
Extent of collaboration 656 0.86 0.72 0 2
Horizontal 1027 0.67 0.47 0 1
Vertical 1027 0.37 0.48 0 1
City 1027 0.19 0.39 0 1
Ln (Pop) 1027 7.93 1.19 2.30 12.20
PID 1027 2.42 2.21 0 7
BA % 1027 0.10 0.061 0.014 0.38
MedInc 1027 43621.47 13361.32 20192 170790
MedPTax 1027 1165.46 663.97 326 10001
MedAge 1027 38.51 5.17 17.9 57.5
Black % 1027 0.021 0.065 0 0.78
Dem % 1027 .050 0.10 0 0.99
Motivation 1015 0.53 0.50 0 1
Opportunity 1015 0.43 0.50 0 1
Neighbors Collab 940 .089 0.56 0 2
County Collab 728 0.91 0.73 0 2
Z(Gi∗) 18k 656 −0.074 1.27 −2.91 4.031
Z(Gi∗) 40k 656 −0.15 1.59 −3.98 3.74
Z(Gi∗) 120k 656 −0.21 2.37 −5.73 3.063
Finally, the fall 2010 MPPS includes FIPS codes as geographic identifiers for each respondent’s
jurisdiction.6 We merged in census information on each jurisdiction’s population from the 2000
census (e.g., total population, median household income, median property tax, median age, percent
black, percent with a bachelor’s degree) as well as jurisdiction-level vote returns from the 2008
presidential election as a proxy for the citizenry’s partisanship. We then created a shapefile in
ArcGIS that treats the survey responses, demographic characteristics and partisanship variables as
jurisdiction attributes.7 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics.
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
Our analyses involve identifying spatial patterns of responses in the MPPS data, testing for spatial
effects at different geographic scales, and testing hypotheses about the factors that influence those
patterns and effects. We utilize two separate but complementary empirical approaches: a spatial
statistical approach (for identifying spatial patterns) and a multivariate regression approach (for
testing hypotheses about the factors that influence patterns of collaboration).
Identifying Patterns of Collaboration
Spatial statistics can tell us whether and where spatial patterns or interdependencies are occurring
in our data. To answer the first question (whether spatial interdependencies are occurring), we
compute the Getis-Ord General G statistic in ArcGIS 10 (Getis & Ord, 1992). General G measures
the degree of clustering of high or low values of a given variable or attribute within a study area.8
In our application, we use this statistic to test whether jurisdictions that report high (low) levels of
collaboration are clustered spatially across the entire state. Our estimated value of General G is .031,
which is significant at p < .003.
To answer the second question (where spatial interdependencies are occurring), we conduct a hot
spot analysis. Hot spot analysis uses spatial statistical techniques to identify local clusters of values
that are significantly further from the overall mean than we would otherwise expect. When these
clusters have values that are significantly higher than expected, they are called hot spots. When the
clusters have values that are significantly lower than expected, they are called cold spots. Our hot
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spot analysis is conducted by generating the Getis-Ord Gi* statistic for each city and village in our
sample within ArcMap 10 (Getis & Ord, 1992; ESRI Developer Network, 2011).9 ArcGIS generates
a new field in the attribute table of Z-scores, which measure the statistical significance of the level of
clustering around a given observation (city/township). The larger the Z-score (in absolute value), the
less likely it is that the distribution of values is random. We performed hot spot analysis using each
governmental unit’s reported level of land use planning collaboration.10
One important consideration in hot spot analysis is the threshold distance. In general, a hot spot
analysis picks up different patterns, and the units’ Z-scores change, based on how the threshold
distance is defined. The threshold distance is the theorized zone of influence. For any given feature
(in this case, jurisdiction), neighbors’ values within the distance band threshold are assumed to
matter. The features outside this distance are assumed not to influence the feature in question.11 How
should we choose a threshold distance? There are several different ways to generate this value. First,
if we do not specify a threshold distance, the program will choose the smallest distance at which each
feature has at least one neighbor (either from point to point or, for lines and polygons, from centroid
to centroid). However, using the default distance threshold lets the data, rather than any theory or
hypothesis, drive the analysis. In addition, the default threshold distance is strongly influenced by
the presence of missing data. For example, when we removed polygons with missing data from our
shapefile, the default threshold distance increased by about two miles, or about 9%.
Another way to choose a threshold distance is to run iterations of the test for spatial autocorrelation
with increasingly large threshold distances until the overall Z-score seems to peak (there may be
more than one peak), and use that distance for the hot spot analysis. Again, though, the distance
threshold at which the Z-score peaks may not be theoretically meaningful.
We argue that the best way to choose a threshold distance is to ground that choice in theory
or in the study’s assumptions. In our study, the literature led us to expect to see influences on
collaboration at three levels: interlocal (subcounty), county, and multicounty region. We therefore
used three different threshold distances in three separate hot spot analysis runs: roughly 11 miles
(18,000 meters), 25 miles (40,000 meters), and 75 miles (120,000 meters). Eleven miles is meant to
reflect interlocal collaboration. We generated this distance by doubling the mean distance between
city and township polygon centroids. Since township sizes vary quite a bit in Michigan, especially
in the Upper Peninsula, we needed to double the mean distance to collect enough neighbors for
each unit. Even so, some units still lacked any neighbors, which would have made the results of the
analysis unreliable. For this smallest distance, then, we used a spatial weights matrix with a threshold
distance of 18,000 meters, but also specified that each unit must have at least two neighbors. In
cases where the nearest neighbors are more than 18,000 meters away, the program overrides the
threshold distance to collect at least two neighbors. As mentioned in the preceding paragraph,
the more missing data there are, the farther the tool has to go to find enough neighbors to conduct
the analysis, so in theory if our response rate had been higher on this question, we would have been
able to use a shorter threshold distance.
We generated the county-level distance of 40,000 meters by taking the mean centroid-to-centroid
distance of the county polygons. The regional-level threshold distance of 120,000 meters is thus
meant to reflect at least a tri-county area. As we discuss in the next section, we found evidence of
spatial effects at each of these levels, but with very different patterns.
Figure 1 reports the results of the hot spot analysis. As expected, we find evidence of land use
planning collaboration at all three of the levels we tested: interlocal, county, and regional. The
patterns at each level look very different, however. At the interlocal level, reported in Panel A, we
see scattered hot spots of collaboration around the state. Some are identifiable as specific interlocal
efforts. For example, the Traverse City area is known for its collaborative efforts, especially the
Grand Traverse Commons Joint Planning Commission. The red square to the southwest of Ann
Arbor is Freedom Township, which is part of the Southwest Washtenaw Council of Governments,
a subcounty intergovernmental organization that runs a joint planning commission. The hot spot
due north of Lansing likely represents the communities involved in the Gratiot County Regional
Excellence and Transformation Plan (GREAT), which each of the subunits have adopted as their
own plan. There are also some large areas of interlocal collaboration west of Lansing, probably
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FIGURE 1
Hot Spot Analysis (Getis-Ord G*) of Q5A_R: Extent of Jurisdiction’s Collaboration Around Land Use
Planning
representing the Barry County Joint Planning Alliance. The hot spot in the central Upper Peninsula
corresponds quite closely to the boundaries of the Central Upper Peninsula Planning and Development
Regional Commission (CUPPAD).
Fewer cold spots appear in the interlocal-level data than in the county and regional analyses
described below. The areas with the most pronounced cold spots are north central Michigan and
southeast Michigan. The seven-county Southeast Michigan Council of Governments (SEMCOG)
essentially makes up metropolitan Detroit. Although SEMCOG is a sophisticated regional organiza-
tion, the Detroit Metro area is known for contentious politics between city and suburbs, and a historic
lack of trust and collaboration (Browne & VerBurg, 1995; Jacobs, 2003). Therefore, this cold spot is
not surprising.
County-level spatial analysis of collaboration around land use in Panel B turns up slightly different
patterns. The Traverse City metro area and Gratiot and Barry counties show up again as hot spots.
In this map, however, some more substantial cold spots emerge as well, around Saginaw and notably
throughout much of Southeast Michigan. Local governments in these areas are far below the state
mean in terms of conducting countywide land use planning efforts.
The results of the regional analysis in Panel C are particularly striking. West Michigan and the
central Upper Peninsula appear as region-wide hot spots. The west Michigan hot spot likely represents
the Grand Valley Metropolitan Council, focused around Kent County (location of the City of Grand
Rapids), which is a 20-year-old voluntary regional government that has been “reasonably effective”
at providing a vehicle for intergovernmental interactions (Visser, 2004, p. 56) and combating sprawl
with an urban utility boundary (Dutzik & Imus, 2002). Southeast Michigan and the “Thumb” area
are major cold spots, even considering the low response rate from the Thumb municipalities. As
we mention above in the results of the interlocal analysis, southeast Michigan is known for its
historic lack of intergovernmental collaboration and regional planning. The Thumb area townships
are generally low-capacity, and the regional culture is generally suspicious of government, and in
particular any action that leans toward collectivism (for example, the Thumb is the traditional home
of the Michigan Militia, a right-wing paramilitary group) (Freedman, 2008). A cold spot here fits
with what we know about attitudes toward regional collaboration in the area.
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Testing Hypotheses About Spatial Influences on Collaboration
The spatial statistical approach shows whether and where collaboration is occurring, but it is
limited in what it can tell us about how various factors influence those patterns. Multivariate regression
analysis allows the researcher to test the marginal effect of one or more factors (independent variables)
on an outcome (dependent variable) while controlling for or holding constant the potential effects of
other factors. In the current context, we are interested in testing hypotheses about whether the spatial
environment (independent variables) of a given jurisdiction affects the extent and form of land use
planning collaboration (dependent variables) it undertakes, controlling for the jurisdiction’s internal
characteristics.
We capture a jurisdiction’s spatial environment by creating several variables from the MPPS
survey. To capture the most local spatial environment, we identify each jurisdiction’s neighbors by
generating a spatial weights matrix in ArcGIS 10 with a weight of 1 assigned to each neighbor (edges
and borders) and of 0 to all others. We then convert this weights matrix to a table, export the table
and merge it into the MPPS survey database, and collapse the survey responses in Stata to compute
the mean value of each unit’s neighbors’ reported level of collaboration.12 The number of neighbors
ranges from 1 to 12, with a mean of 6.44.13 We also include the jurisdiction’s Z-score from the hot
spot analysis, using the smallest (18,000 meter) threshold distance, as an additional measure of the
jurisdiction’s most local spatial environment.
To capture county-level environment, we identify each jurisdiction’s county and record the county’s
response to the same survey question regarding level of land use collaboration.14 Interestingly, we
observe that, on average, counties report a higher level of collaboration than individual jurisdictions,
with a mean value of 0.97 (on the same 0–2 scale) compared to the local governments’ mean value
of 0.85. We further capture county-level spatial environment with the jurisdiction’s Z-score from the
hot spot analysis using the 40,000-meter threshold distance.
To capture regional-level spatial environment, we include the jurisdiction’s hot spot analysis Z-
score using the 120,000-meter distance band. Unfortunately, the MPPS sample did not include any
regional organizations (e.g., COGs, RCs, MPOs), so we do not have direct (reported) measures of
collaboration at the regional level.
The regression analyses then take a given city or township’s response to the land use collaboration
and horizontal/vertical collaboration questions as the dependent variables, and the various spatial
environment measures as the main independent variables. The jurisdiction’s population characteristics
and vote returns serve as control variables.
Table 2 reports the results of a set of multivariate regression analyses that allows us to test H1 (that
spatial context affects a jurisdiction’s level of collaboration). The table reports six separate regression
analyses. In each model, the dependent variable is a local government’s reported level of land use
collaboration. This variable takes on three values: 0 (no collaboration), 1 (some collaboration), and 2
(a great deal of collaboration). Since our dependent variable is discrete and ordinal, the assumptions
of standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression are violated. We therefore estimated the models
using generalized ordered logistic regression, which allows the researcher to test for whether the
proportional odds/ parallel lines assumptions of ordered logistic regression are met.15,16
Each model includes a different set of independent variables. Model 1 is our baseline model which
includes only jurisdiction-level demographic and political characteristics. The results in Model 1
show that jurisdiction-level characteristics have some impact on a city or township’s extent of
collaboration on land use planning. All else constant, cities report lower levels of collaboration than
townships. Cities and townships with higher property taxes and older residents report lower levels of
collaboration, while those with a more educated population report higher levels.
Model 2 adds the Motivation and Opportunity variables. Both are positive and significant, suggest-
ing that jurisdictions that seek out collaborative opportunities (Motivation) and that are approached
by potential collaborative partners (Opportunity) engage in higher levels of collaboration. Of the two,
the effect of Opportunity is larger and more precisely estimated (i.e., has a smaller standard error).
Model 3 captures the jurisdiction’s collaborative environment at various spatial scales by including
the reported mean level of collaboration of the jurisdiction’s neighbors (interlocal scale) and the
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TABLE 2
Extent of Collaboration: Generalized Ordered Logit Results, Partial Proportional Odds
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
City −.53 −.51∗∗ −.60∗∗ −.25 −.18 −.41∗
Ln (Pop) [1] .034 −.020 .043 .15 .11 025
Ln (Pop) [2] −.17 −.25∗∗ −.39∗∗ −.14 −.17 −.22∗
PID .044 .044 .037 .066∗ .055 .049
BA % [1] 10.69∗∗∗ 10.096∗∗∗ 6.90∗∗ 3.72 4.42∗ 6.70∗∗
BA % [2] 5.19∗∗ 5.13∗∗ −1.54 −.67 1.87
MedInc −.000016 −.000014 −7.86e-06 −5.66e-06 2.15e-06 −1.58e-06
MedPTax −.00071∗∗ −.00073∗∗ −.00076∗∗ −.00014 −.00035 −.00046
MedAge −.046∗∗ −.045∗∗ −.055∗∗ −.017 −.014 −.034∗
Black % −.71 −.77 −2.39 −.32 −.28 −.78
Dem % −.23 −.40 −.60 −.48 −.0016 .30
Motivation .36∗∗ .42∗∗ .24 .29∗ .32∗
Opportunity .41∗∗ .44∗∗ .40∗∗ .43∗∗ .40∗∗
Neighbors Collab .51∗∗
County Collab [1] .15
County Collab [2] .51∗∗
Z(Gi∗)_18k .90∗∗∗
Z(Gi∗)_40k .42∗∗∗
Z(Gi∗)_120k .14∗∗∗
Constant [1] 2.76∗∗ 2.78∗∗ 2.36 .17 −.23 1.20
Constant [2] 2.83∗∗ 2.95∗∗ 3.26∗ .46 .24 1.49
χ2 7.44 10.23 11.31 11.04 11.15 11.64
Prob>χ2 .38 .33 .42 .35 .35 .31
Pseudo R2 .036 .044 .073 .16 .08 .053
N 656 651 438 651 651 651
Note: ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01.
reported collaboration of the jurisdiction’s county (county scale). The effects of collaboration by a
jurisdiction’s immediate neighbors and by its county are both positive and significant. The odds ratio
associated with a one-unit increase in neighbors’ collaboration is 1.66. In other words, as the reported
collaboration of a city’s or township’s neighbors increases by one unit, the odds of a jurisdiction’s
own collaboration moving to the next higher reported level (i.e., from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 2) is 1.66.
This effect holds even after we account for the various drivers of collaboration that are internal to the
jurisdiction. The effect of county-level spatial environment has a positive and significant effect on
the probability of moving from some collaboration to a great deal of collaboration, again controlling
for jurisdiction-level factors.
Models 4 through 6 include the jurisdiction’s Gi* Z-score from the hot spot analyses with threshold
distances set at 18,000 meters (interlocal scale), 40,000 meters (county scale) and 120,000 meters
(regional scale), respectively.17 We see that all of these effects are positive and highly significant,
suggesting that being located in a spatial environment in which a jurisdiction’s neighbors, county,
and region are engaging in high levels of collaboration leads that jurisdiction to itself collaborate.
Of the three spatial scales, the effect of being in a local hot spot (Model 4) is the largest. Finally,
when the hot spot variables are included in the models, the effects of most of a jurisdiction’s internal
characteristics are no longer significant.
The results reported in Table 2 provide support for H1, that a local government’s decision to engage
in intergovernmental collaboration is affected by its spatial context at several geographic scales.
Due to how the survey question was framed, however, it does not tell us whether those decisions
involve horizontal collaboration, vertical collaboration, or both. The following analyses leverage the
additional questions on the fall 2010 MPPS to test H2, whether motivation and opportunity influence
different types of collaboration, as well as H3, whether horizontal and vertical collaborative endeavors
are complements to or substitutes for one another.
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TABLE 3
Collaboration Partners: Percent of Jurisdictions Reporting, Michigan Local Governments
Partner Percent of Cities Reporting (N = 173) Percent of Townships Reporting (N = 750)
State 11.56 2.80
County 51.44 28.13
City 47.40 23.87
Township 63.58 50.80
Village 10.98 14.80
K-12 School dist 27.75 7.33
Higher ed inst 5.78 0.93
Regional org 22.54 8.00
TABLE 4
Patterns of Horizontal and Vertical Collaboration, Michigan Local Governments
Vertical
N Y Total
Horizontal N 302 32 334
Y 340 353 693
Total 642 385 1027
Table 3 reports the number of cities and townships in the MPPS sample that reported collaborating
with each of the eight types of partners.18 Collaborating with state, county, and regional organization
partners is considered a vertical form of collaboration; city, township, village, and K-12 school district
partners are considered horizontal forms. We see that the most frequent collaboration partners for
both types of jurisdictions are townships, counties, and cities. Thus, cities and townships alike are
engaging in both horizontal and vertical collaboration, though cities report greater frequencies of
collaboration with all types of partners (except villages).19,20
Table 4 reports the number of cities and villages in the MPPS sample that report some incidence
of horizontal collaboration, vertical collaboration, neither, and both. The table shows a great deal of
heterogeneity among cities and villages in their approaches to collaboration. Roughly 30% report
no collaboration at all; 33% report horizontal only; 3% report vertical only; and 34% report both.
These patterns provide preliminary evidence that the two forms of collaboration do not function
as substitutes, but rather that communities pursue different forms of collaboration for different
reasons. It is also interesting that we see nearly one-third of communities reporting only horizontal
collaboration and one-third reporting both horizontal and vertical, but very few reporting only vertical
collaboration. The multivariate analyses below explore these preliminary results in greater detail.
Tables 5 and 6 investigate the determinants of horizontal and vertical collaboration, respectively.
The tables are organized much the same as Table 2, with the results of six separate regression analyses
– containing the same independent variables as those in Table 2 – reported in each table’s columns.
In these tables, however, the dependent variables are whether or not the jurisdiction reported any
horizontal or vertical collaboration, with Horizontal scored one if the respondent indicated partnering
with a city, township, village or school district and scored zero otherwise, and with Vertical scored
one if the respondent indicated partnering with a state, county, or regional organization and scored
zero otherwise. Given our binary dependent variables, we employ logistic regression.
The logit coefficients for horizontal collaboration in Table 5 show that Motivation and Opportunity,
as well as several internal characteristics, strongly affect the probability that a jurisdiction engages
in collaboration with other local governments, while none of the spatial variables are significant in
any of the models. In the baseline model in Column 1, cities, larger jurisdictions, those with more
educated populations, and those with Democratic Party elected officials are more likely to engage
in horizontal collaboration; those with higher property taxes are less likely. The effect of being a
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TABLE 5
Horizontal Collaboration, Logistic Regression Coefficients
City 1.20∗∗∗ 1.083∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗ .99 0.95 0.93
Ln (Pop) 0.41∗∗∗ 0.15 0.17 −0.082 −0.081 −0.11
PID 0.081∗∗ 0.073∗ 0.066 0.15∗ 0.14∗ 0.14∗
BA % 9.56∗∗∗ 6.72∗∗ 7.12∗∗ −2.062 −1.046 0.42
MedInc 6.49e-06 0.000016 0.000019 0.000063∗∗ 0.000058∗∗ 0.000057∗∗
MedPTax −0.00054∗∗ −0.00063∗∗ −.00079 0.00010 1.59e-06 −0.00012
MedAge −0.0020 0.0025 0.0077 0.024 0.021 0.015
Black % −1.84 −2.86∗ −3.59∗ −2.85 −2.94 −3.13
Dem % 0.26 0.35 −0.69 0.54 0.37 0.45
Motivation 1.88∗∗∗ 1.96∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗
Opportunity 1.15∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗ 0.82∗∗ 0.86∗∗
Neighbors Collab −0.14
County Collab 0.16
Z(Gi∗)_18k 0.068
Z(Gi∗)_40k 0.029
Z(Gi∗)_120k −0.14
Constant −3.41∗∗∗ −2.80∗∗ −2.58 −1.97 −1.56 −1.10
R2 .11 .25 .27 .13 .13 .13
N 1,027 1,015 666 651 651 651
Note: ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01.
TABLE 6
Vertical Collaboration, Logistic Regression Coefficients
City 0.61∗∗ 0.56∗∗ 0.80∗∗ 0.18 0.27 0.30
Ln (Pop) 0.43∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.29∗∗
PID 0.016 0.0080 0.020 −0.0040 −0.0014 −0.00021
BA% 9.39∗∗∗ 7.34∗∗∗ 6.27∗∗ 8.61∗∗∗ 6.68∗∗ 6.083∗∗
MedInc −0.000020∗ −0.000018∗ −1.12e-06 −0.000032∗∗ −0.000026∗∗ −0.000026∗∗
MedPTax −0.00061∗∗ −0.00059∗∗ −0.00093∗∗ −0.00059∗ −0.00045 −0.00038
MedAge −0.014 −0.012 0.00092 −0.022 −0.012 −0.0098
Black % 0.55 0.41 1.46 2.11 2.31 2.47
Dem % −0.43 −0.69 −1.091 −2.13∗ −1.92 −2.050∗
Motivation 1.0041∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.34∗
Opportunity 0.76∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.45∗∗
Neighbors Collab 0.065
County Collab 0.18
Z(Gi∗)_18k −0.037
Z(Gi∗)_40k 0.074
Z(Gi∗)_120k 0.20∗∗
Constant −2.72∗∗ −2.16∗ −2.78∗ 0.74 −0.23 −0.37
R2 .081 .14 .14 .061 .061 .069
N 1,027 1,015 666 651 651 651
Note: ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01.
city and having a Democratic Party elected official are largely robust to the inclusion of the spatial
variables.
In Column 2, we see that both Motivation and Opportunity are strong and significant, and remain
so in the other models as well. Motivation is consistently larger, suggesting that jurisdictions that
are actively engaging and seeking out partnerships with other local governments are more likely to
undertake this form of collaboration.
In Columns 3–6, we see that none of the spatial effects are significant. Thus, in stark contrast to the
strong and significant effects of all of the spatial environment variables on the extent of collaboration,
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there is no systematic effect of spatial collaborative environment on the likelihood of this particular
form of collaboration.21
Table 6 reports comparable logit coefficients for our models of vertical collaboration. We observe
some interesting similarities with Table 5. Many of the internal characteristics have similar effects
in the baseline model, with cities, larger jurisdictions, those with more highly educated populations,
and those with lower property taxes more likely to engage in both forms of collaboration. Also as in
Table 5, most of the spatial effects are insignificant. An important exception is the regional (120,000-
meter) hot spot variable. Being part of a regional land use collaboration hot spot significantly affects
the probability of vertical collaboration. Being part of a county-level hot spot is also positive but is
not significant.
There are other important differences between Tables 5 and 6. Both Motivation and Opportunity
are again significant in Table 6, but whereas Motivation had the stronger effect in the models of
horizontal collaboration, the reverse is true for most of the models of vertical collaboration: being
approached by other governments has a stronger effect on this form of collaboration than being the
one who reaches out to others, at least once we account for being in a collaborative hot spot. In other
words, vertical collaboration is a more top-down process than horizontal collaboration, and the data
bear this out.
DISCUSSION
We frame our discussion in terms of the article’s three hypotheses:
 H1: Local units of government whose neighbors are engaged in higher levels of intergovern-
mental collaboration are themselves more likely to collaborate.
 H2: Motivation is a stronger determinant of horizontal collaboration, while opportunity is a
stronger determinant of vertical collaboration.
 H3: Communities that engage in horizontal collaboration are no less likely to engage in vertical
collaboration: the two are not substitutes for one another.
In our tests of H1, all of the spatial effects are significant in the models of the extent of col-
laboration in Table 2, suggesting that they influence the amount of collaboration around land use,
but less so the form of collaboration (as evidenced by the insignificant effects in Tables 5 and 6).
Instead, internal characteristics are more important in the latter. So, the collaborative behavior of
a community’s neighbors influences whether and to what extent that community collaborates, but
not necessarily with whom. There is one exception to this observation, however, which is that the
extent of regional collaboration (hot spot at 120,000 meters) is a significant predictor in the model
of vertical collaboration (Table 6). Given that the MPPS respondents all represent local units of
government, by definition any collaboration they engage in at the regional level (above the county)
is vertical in nature. From this perspective, this result is not surprising. It is somewhat surprising,
however, that similar spatial effects are not apparent at the horizontal level. It is possible that these
effects are complicated by horizontal collaboration between counties.
The question of motivation versus opportunity (H2) produces particularly interesting results.
Reporting that one’s local officials approached others regarding collaboration (i.e., Motivation) and
that one’s jurisdiction was approached by officials from other jurisdictions (i.e., Opportunity) are
both associated with higher levels of collaboration. In other words, either the presence of available
partners or a culture of collaboration makes it more likely that a unit will collaborate. Opportunity
is a stronger determinant of level of collaboration. Further, opportunity seems to be more associated
with vertical collaboration than motivation does, while motivation is more strongly associated with
horizontal collaboration. We interpret this result to mean that local governments are more likely to
join an existing county or regional-led effort and are less likely to organize such an effort themselves.
This is consistent with the observation that higher levels of government are more likely to have the
resources to organize such an effort.
Finally, our analysis indicates that horizontal and vertical collaboration are more complements to
rather than substitutes for each other (H3). The bivariate correlation is just .40, and the determinants
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of vertical collaboration (Table 6) are quite different from those of horizontal collaboration (Table 5).
For example, the roles of Motivation and Opportunity are reversed between the two—we discuss
this difference in detail below. In other words, different kinds of communities engage in each type of
collaboration, and there are many that do only one or the other. Anecdotally, many township residents
and officials embrace the idea of limited government and local control. To these actors, horizontal
collaboration might not have the same “big government” baggage as does vertical collaboration.
Framing a collaborative effort as neighbors working together may be viewed as less contradictory to
a culture of self-sufficiency than does getting involved in a regional, top-down planning effort.
CONCLUSION
This article contributes to our understanding of intergovernmental collaboration in three important
ways: we assess factors influencing both vertical and horizontal collaboration simultaneously; we
analyze both internal jurisdictional and external (regional cultural) factors influencing collaboration:
and we distinguish between motivation and opportunity as drivers of collaboration. In all of these
analyses, we identify previously overlooked spatial patterns of collaboration. Despite Michigan’s
reputation for parochialism, we find considerable collaborative activity around land use in the state
at each of three theoretically justified levels: interlocal, county-wide, and regional. We also find
that the collaborative activity of neighboring communities around land use has a significant effect
on whether a community will choose to engage in such planning efforts. Regional norms around
collaboration seem to matter, as does the availability of partners. We demonstrate these spatial effects
of regional land use planning through regression analysis, and even more strikingly in our spatial
statistical analysis, where we identify hot spots and cold spots of collaborative land use planning.
One caveat to our analysis here is that, although certain areas of the state appear visually as hot
spots of regional land use planning, it is important to keep in mind that what respondents report
as high levels of collaboration in Michigan may be modest in comparison to collaborative efforts
in states with stronger traditions of regional collaboration around land use. As Visser (2004) notes,
“Michigan is noted for strong constitutional and state-level political support for local autonomy,
powerful township governments legally capable of providing many urban services, and weak support
for regional entities” (p. 54). Indeed, all of the collaborative efforts noted in the results section above
are voluntary, making them especially vulnerable to changing political priorities.
Future analysis could expand and enhance the conclusions of this research in several ways.
Additional survey research could be conducted asking respondents more specifically about which
types of collaboration they undertake and involving which partners, in order to better understand the
extent and nature of the many collaborative efforts identified in this study. Combined qualitative and
quantitative research could help explain the directionality (motivation vs. opportunity) of types of
collaborative relationships and how they function on the ground, as well as generate recommendations
for making collaborative efforts more successful.
ENDNOTES
1 The third type of relationship, which may be called a consolidationist approach to vertical regional governance,
creates an actual governmental structure that handles regional issues. It may even involve the expansion of central
city boundaries through annexation or a city-county government consolidation (Savitch & Vogel, 2000, p. 162).
2 The extent to which counties hold hierarchical powers relative to cities/townships, and hence are appropriately
considered to be at a higher level within the hierarchy of governments, varies greatly across states. In Michigan,
counties have autonomous land use planning authority, and may undertake planning functions on behalf of their
cities and townships.
3 The Michigan Public Policy Survey is conducted by the University of Michigan’s Center for Local, State, and
Urban Policy, and a number of other sponsors. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations
expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding organizations.
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4 A total of 3,502 invitations were sent, with 1,423 individual responses received, for an overall response rate of
41%. For the analyses conducted in this study, only a single response from each jurisdiction—typically from the
city manager or township clerk—was included.
5 Although this question did not specify the functional area of collaboration, land use planning was one of the most
frequently reported areas of collaboration on the previous question. Only public safety functions (fire, 911, and
police) were mentioned much more frequently. Land use planning was reported about as frequently as the related
areas of economic development, parks and recreation, and utilities. Therefore, while we cannot isolate the specific
partners for land use planning versus other collaborative activities based on this question, it is quite likely that
many respondents had land use planning in mind when they answered this question.
6 We also include a measure of the respondent’s partisanship (if reported) to capture the city/village government’s
partisan leaning.
7 Because our analyses involve mapping and analyzing spatial relationships between jurisdictions, we limit our
data set to those cities and townships that comprise the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Subdivision geography for
Michigan. This geographic designation excludes villages since they geographically overlap townships (i.e., a given
village resident is also a resident of an underlying township) and so (1) some information such as vote returns are
not reported separately for villages, and (2) measuring geographic neighbors becomes highly ambiguous.
8 Specifically, G =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
wi,j xixj
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
xixj
,∀j = i, where xi and xj are attribute values for units i and j, and wi,j is the
spatial weight between units i and j.
9 Specifically, G∗i =
n∑
j=1
wi,j xj − X
n∑
j=1
wi,j
S
√
n[
n∑
j=1
w2i,j − (
n∑
j=1
wi,j )]
n − 1
, where xj is a is an attribute of unit j, wi,j is the spatial weight
between units i and j, n is the total number of units, X =
n∑
j=1
xj
n
and S =
√
n∑
j=1
x2i
n
− (X)2 .
10 We also ran tests for global spatial autocorrelation (Moran’s I), since hot spot analysis may not be appropriate
for data with significant global spatial autocorrelation (Anselin, 1995, p. 97). In this case, however, there was no
significant evidence of global spatial autocorrelation. For the threshold distances we used, the global Moran’s I
statistic ranged from 0.16 to 0.03, suggesting that Gi* is appropriate.
11 There are numerous options in the ArcGIS hot spot analysis tool for determining the nature of the spatial
relationship. In this case, we used a fixed distance band with Euclidean distance.
12 We also construct measures of neighbors’ population characteristics such as median household income, median
property tax, and partisan composition, though none of these variables are significant in any of the analyses.
13 To construct measures of neighbors’ level of collaboration, we can only include information from neighbors
that completed the MPPS survey. The number of such neighbors ranges from 0 to 10, with a mean number of
responding neighbors of 4.46.
14 County respondents to the MPPS were asked many of the same questions as city and township respondents,
including those about their extent of collaboration, in addition to some unique questions as well. The county
responses are not included in the main analyses.
15 Specifically, ordered logit requires that the slope coefficients are the same across each level of the dependent
variable. We conducted generalized ordered logistic regression analyses in Stata 11 and tested for whether the
models met this “parallel lines” assumption. In all six models, the slope coefficients are statistically indistin-
guishable across each level except for size (ln(Pop)) and education (BA%). In one model (Model 3), the county
collaboration variable is found to violate the parallel lines assumption as well. The generalized ordered logistic re-
gression operation in Stata constrains the coefficients that meet the assumption to be identical and reports separate
coefficients for those that do not meet the parallel lines assumption. The results presented in Table 2 reflect these
estimates.
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16 We also estimate the models using OLS and obtain similar results in terms of sign and significance. Because the
underlying logit model takes on a different functional form than OLS, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients
are not comparable. Results of the OLS analyses are available from the authors upon request.
17 Due to high levels of multicollinearity between the spatial environment variables, we are not able to include all of
the measures in a single model.
18 Recall that this question refers to collaboration in general, and not to land use planning collaboration specifically.
This table does not include the other option.
19 This pattern is likely due to the unique relationship between villages and townships in Michigan. Townships
are the state’s basic unit of local government. When a village incorporates, the underlying township boundaries
remain and residents pay taxes to and receive services from both the village and the township. As such, townships
and villages may find it beneficial to coordinate their service delivery.
20 Note that this greater frequency of collaboration by cities is diminished in the multivariate analyses in Table 2
once we control for other factors such a jurisdiction’s demographic, political, and spatial characteristics.
21 This lack of significance may be due, in part, to the mismatch between the dependent variable, which refers
to horizontal and vertical collaboration in general, and the spatial environment variables, which ask specifically
about collaboration around land use planning.
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